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EARLY HiSTORY
Almost since the beginnings of capitalistic society the exacting lender has been
regarded with universal opprobrium and antipathy. We find this aversion in the laws
of ancient China, in the Hindu Institutes of Manu, in the Koran of Mahomet and
among the ancient Greeks and Romans.1 Under the Code of Hammurabi 2 the king
of Babylon fixed the rate of interest. Among the Athenians usage fixed the rate at
i2%, and the profound contempt to which those not conforming were condemned
formed a punishment so great that additional punishment was deemed unnecessary.
The Romans experimented between no laws against usury and the other extreme of
disallowing any interest.3 It is from the Roman law expression for indemnification
for loss due to the delay in the interval or interesse before repayment that our modern
word "interest" is derived.4
Among the Jews the term "usury" was synonymous with the term "interest," and
meant the taking of any compensation whatever for the use of money. Under the
Mosaic law the Jew was prohibited from collecting anything by way of compensation
for the lending of money or any other goods to fellow Israelites, although permitted
to exact gain from aliens.5
Also the taking of any interest or gain constituted the offense of usury in the early
Christian church,8 at common law and under the canonical law of the Church of
England. The usurer was not only punished by the censures of the church in his
lifetime, but was denied a Christian buriaf. By the laws of Alfred the Great and
Edward the Confessor, if, after death, even, a man was found to have been a usurer,
*This discussion is directed toward various aspects of the general usury laws as distinguished from
those of special classes which have, in many jurisdictions, been taken outside the scope and operation of
the general usury laws through such legislation as special small loan laws, pawnbroker's acts, Morris Plan
acts, special bank acts, building and loan association laws, and credit union laws.
A tabular presentation of certain aspects of the usury statutes is presented in the Chart on pp. 48-53.
References are made to this Chart throughout the text without further citation.
t A.B., 1939, Duke University. Now a member of the third-year class in the Duke University School of
Law. Editor-in-chief of the DuKE BAR ASSOCIATION JouRNAL.
'Dunham v. Gould, 16 Johns. 367, 376 (N. Y. 18i9).
'CODE OF HAmtmuAEI, §51.
8 Dunham v. Gould, supra note I, at 377, 379. '8 ENcYC. Soc. SCIENCEs (932) 131.
'DEUTERoNoMY XXIII, 19, 20. See also LEviTcus XXV, 35-37; ExoDuS XXII, 25; PSALMS XV, 5.
'Exemplary of the opinion entertained that the taking of interest was a detestable vice, hateful to
man and conirary to the laws of God, is the phillippic of St. Basil, a theologian of the early Christian
church, quoted in Commonwealth v. Donoghue, 25o Ky. 343, 351, 63 S. NV. (2d) 3, 6 (1933).
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his goods were forfeited to the crown, and his lands to the lord of the fee.7 In the
fifteenth century, church leaders, realizing that the struggling commerce of the times
was making additional sources of capital a virtual necessity, advanced the peculiar
doctrine that Jews might be allowed to take interest, since they were to be damned
in any case, and by giving them a monopoly of the business the souls of Christians
might not be lost." Under the impact of this realization the Church began to view
financial transactions in a more favorable light Thus while the Church forbade
the charging or taking of interest, it allowed the creditor to collect a fine if the
principal sum was not returned at the specified maturity. Soon it became the custom
for the parties to insert a penal clause (poena conventionalis) and to stipulate a purely
nominal loan period in the agreement, after the expiration of which the debtor be-
came at once liable for principal and the penalty. But regardless of this penal clause
the Church approved the collection of damnum emerkens, damages sustained as the
result of the loan; and later the concept lucrum cessans, by which the creditor might
recover the profit he would have made had he employed the loaned money in some
productive enterprise. Still another escape was available by the use of the partnership
agreement in conjunction with the insurance contract and the sale of future uncertain
profit (contractus trinus).
In England the demands of a growing empire soon made necessary the recon-
ciliation, as Francis Bacon expressed it,'0 of two considerations: "The one, that the
tooth of usury be grinded that it bite not too much; the other, that there be left open
the means to invite moneyed men to lend for the continuing and quickening of
trade." In 1545, in response to these needs of expanding business and commerce, the
statute of Henry VIII 1" authorized the taking of lawful interest by an act providing
for a io% maximum because, in the words of the statute, "where divers actes have
bene made for the avoyding and punishment of usury; being a thing unlawful, and
other corrupt bargaines, shifts, and chevisances, which be so obscure in terms, and
so many questtions growen upon ye same, and of so litle effect, that litle punish-
ment, but rather incouragement to offenders that ensued thereby." However, ten
years later this law was repealed by a statute' 2 which prohibited the taking of any
interest whatsoever on pain of forfeiting the entire debt. But the need for the exten-
sion of the credit system and the employment of capital remained, so in 1570 the
repealed statute of Henry VIII was reEnacted.' 3 Finally in 1714 by the Statute of
Usury,14 which was to become the prototype of all such legislation in the United
States, the rate was lowered to 5%, which rate remained the maximum until all
English usury laws were abolished in i854.15
'See Gray v. Bennett, 3 Mete. 522, 527 (Mass. 1842); Schlesinger v. State, 195 Wis. 366, 372, 218
N. W. 440, 442 (1928).
'Marshall v. Beeler, 104 Kan. 32, 36, 178 Pac. 245, 247 (1919).
'For a discussion of the devices employed to circumvent the strict prohibition of tho Church of Eng-
land against the taking of any interest see 15 ENcYc. Soc. SCIENCES (1932) 195, 196.
" MoRLu EssAYs No. 41 (Usury). 11 37 HNRY VIII, c. 9.
125 & 6 EDw. VI, c. 2o (1555). " 13 EIz., C. 8. it 12 ANNE, c. x6.
25 17 & x8 Viar., c. 9o . The English Money-Lenders Act, 19oo, 63 & 64 Vicr., c. 51, provides for
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INFLUENCE OF ECONOMISTS
In spite of the age-old aversion to the charging of high rates of interest, economists
in the eighteenth century, foremost among whom were Turgot and Bentham,10 con-
tested the soundness and practicability of the laws restricting the charging of interest,
contending that the laws were mischievous and easily evaded and denying that the
arbitrary fixing of maximum rates by the legislature in any ivay curbed or stabilized
the prevailing market rate. Eventually such writings and arguments produced pro-
found effects, influencing the final repeal in England of all laws against usury in
1854. In Denmark they were repealed in 1855; in Spain, in 1856; in Sardinia, Hol-
land, Norway, and Geneva, in 1857; in Saxony and Sweden, in 1864; in Belgium, in
1865; and in Prussia and the North German Confederation, in x86 7.17
DEVELOPMENT IN AMEmCA
In America too the prohibitions against usury showed some signs of being whittled
away. In 185o New York"' disallowed the defense of usury to corporations, mo-
tivated, perhaps, by the feeling that corporations were large monied combinations
not needing the protection accorded individuals, and by a general policy of aiding
the development of the resources of the country by allowing high rates of interest to
attract capital to new ventures. By 1940 fourteen other states (see Chart) have fol-
lowed suit and entirely deny to corporations the right to plead usury as a defense.
The legislation of recent years has in many states brought about rather extensive
relaxation of the effect of the general usury laws through the creation of exempted
and especially treated classes by such legislation as small loan laws, pawnbroker's
acts, Morris Plan acts, special bank acts and credit union laws. Some of the legisla-
tion of this type prescribes its own penalties and remedies in case of noncompliance
with the statutory provisions, but in many instances the violator of the special statute
will be subject to the provisions of the general usury law also.
In 1867 the brilliant speech of Representative Richard H. Dana, Jr., advocating
the repeal of the usury laws before the .Houise of Representatives of Massachusetts,
was climaxed by the repeal of the general usury law by that commonwealth, never
to be readopted. Following the lines of argument presented by Bentham and Turgot,
Dana deplored the absurdity of arbitrary legislative attempts to fix the market rate
of interest without regard to the duration and amount of the loan, the security given
and the other risk factors of various types of loans. In 188o thirteen states Were
the re-opening of transactions of money-lenders where proceedings were brought for enforcement of any
agreement or security and where the court finds the interest excessive or the transaction harsh and uncon-
scionable, in which case the court would relieve the person sued from payment of any sum in excess of
sum adjudged by the court to be fairly due, allowing a recovery if any such excess paid. The Moneylenders
Act, 1927, 17 & x8 GEO. V, c. 21, amended the xgoo act to the effect that any rate in excess of 48% per
annum should be presumed to be excessive and unconscionable unless the contrary be shown.
" Turgot, Mimoire Sur les Prts d'Argent (769), Bentham, Letters in Defense of Usury (1787); see
RYAN, UsUtY AND UsURY LAws (1924) cc. 6, 7.
" RYAN, op. cit. supta note x6, at 57 citing PAL.ostAVE, 2 Dicr. POL. EcoN. 433-434.
"
8 Laws of i85o, c. 172, now GIN. Bus. LAw, §374.
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without any stipulated maximum. But today in only four states, Massachusetts,
Colorado, Maine and New Hampshire (see Chart), may parties contract for any
rate stipulated in writing, the latter state being the last to abolish its statutory restric-
tions, in 192i. Rhode Island, however, might well be classified as a fifth such state
since its 30% maximum is too high to have any such deterrent effect as the maximums
of the other forty-three states, ranging from 6 to i2% (see Chart)."9
MORAL v. LEGAL UsuRy
Usury is characteristically defined as a loan or forbearance of money or something
circulating as money, repayable absolutely with an exaction in excess of interest
allowed by law, and made with an unlawful intent.20 The common law in force in
America does not prohibit a contract for the payment of interest, where the sum
agreed upon is not "unconscionable." 21 Therefore, in the absence of statutory restric-
tion there can be no legal usury.22 Such a definition has been criticized23 as ignoring
the primary purpose behind every law against usury: the prevention of moral usury,
i.e., the taking advantage of the necessitous condition or inexperience of the borrower,
as distinguished from merely taking more than the law allows. In those states having
legal maximums no distinction is made in the general usury laws between- "moral"
and "legal" usury, nor, for the most part, as to the different types of consumer loans,
yet the statutes are framed upon the assumption that, because of the disparity in the
conditions of borrowers and lenders in general, they cannot be considered in pali
delicto, and that the indigent debtors are under such moral duress as to take from
them the character of particeps CriMinis. 2 4 While this "legal" usury concept is gen-
erally adhered to with reference to the general usury laws, with the exception of
several states which have imposed greater penalties for the taking of exorbitant or
extortionate rates of interest, there has been an ever increasing tendency toward the
individualization of treatment of various types of loans, borrowers and lenders
through the adoption of the Uniform Small Loan Law25 and other special legislation
of the type already referred to.
But regardless of the arguments urged in opposition to the general usury laws as
they now exist either from the business or economic standpoint or as an effective
"g At least five state constitutions prescribe the highest rate that the legislature may stipulate as the
maximum contract rate: A x. CoNST. Art. XIX, §13; CALIF. CoNsr. AmENio. Art. XX, §22; OKLA. CONsT.
Art. 14, §2; TENN. CONsT. Art. 11, §7; TEX. CoNsr. Art. XVI, §i.
20 Jenkins v. Dugger, 96 F. (2d) 727 (C. C. A. 6th, 1938); In re Graham, 22 F. Supp. 233 (W. D. Ky.
1938); Clemens v. Crane, 234 Il1. 215, 84 N. E. 884 (xgo8); Allen v. Newton, 266 S. W. 327 (Mo.
App. 1924); Doster v. English, x52 N. C. 339, 67 S. E. 754 (go).
2 Thomas v. Clarkson, 125 Ga. 72, 54 S. E. 77 (i9o6); Folsom v. Continental Adjustment Corp., 48
Ga. App. 435, 172 S. E. 833 (3934); Houghtor v. Page, 2 N. H. 42 (1819).
2* Fisher v. Bidwell, 27 Conn. 363 (x858); Matlack Properties v. Citizens & Southern Nat. Bank, 12o
Fla. 77, z62 So. 148 (1935); Whitworth v. Davey, 279 Mo. 672, 216 S. W. 736 (g99); Unioni Estates
Co. v. Adlon Const. Co., 221 N. Y. x83, 116 N. E. 984 (1917).
RYAN, op. cit. supra note 16 passim.
" Marshall v. Beeler, supra note 8; McArthur v. Shenck, 31 Wis. 673, 676; WEBB, UsURY (i899) §I7;
cf. . Osno GEN. CoDE ANN. (Page, 1938) div. III, c. 1, §8307.
"' See Hubachek, infra p. ioS.
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deterrent of "moral" usury, such legislation has tended to lower the maximum rate
allowable by contract. However, as indicated, many types of loans formerly within
the operation of the general usury law, have been withdrawn and put in special
classes wherein much higher rates are allowed. The repugnance against the taking
of "legal" usury is still wide-spread and the attitude of one Kentucky court2" is
shared by many jurisdictions: "We think a better comparison or analogy is to look
upon the offense (of usury) and the law as fraud, deceit, cheating and kindred
wrongs are viewed." Many courts, if not the economists, still feel that the debtor is
held in financial peonage and that general usury laws are necessary to protect him
from the greed of the oppressive lender and still think of the creditor who willfully
attempts to take more than the law allows as a Shylock exacting his pound of flesh.
NATURE OF DEFENSE
Though 44 states have general usury laws for the protection of the borrower, it is
generally held that, the defense being entirely for his benefit, the debtor must bear
the onus of specially pleading and proving usury,27 and may waive such a defense.28
The protection of the usury statutes has been held waivable even in states which
declare that usury renders the transaction entirely void, thereby, in effect, making the
transaction voidable at the option of the debtor rather than strictly void.29 Also it
is held that the borrower by his action and representations may be estopped to set
up the defense of usury.80 Though the plea of usury is generally held to be personal
to the borrower or his legal representative, several states have statutes which make
this plea available to any person having a legal or equitable interest in the estate or
assets of the borrower, the debtor's accommodation endorser, guarantor, or surety, any
junior mortgagee or lien holder or by the vendee or grantee of any property involved
in, pledged or mortgaged as security for the alleged usurious loan.81
'Commonwealth v. Donoghue, supra note 6, at 358, 63 S. W. (2d) at 9.
"Stedham v. Swift & Co., 79 F. (2d) 648 (C. C. A. 5th, 1935); Medical Arts Bldg. Co. v. Southern
Finance & Development Co., 29 F. (2d) 969 (C. C. A. 5th, 1929); Dublin Veneer Co. v. KendrckA 179
Ga. 237, 175 S. E. 687 (1934); Penn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Orr, 217 Iowa 1022, .252 N. W. 745 (1934);
Fred G. Clark Co. v. E. C. Warner Co., 188 Minn. 277, 247 N. W. 225 (1933); Schoolcraft v. Temple
Trust Co., 64 S. W. (2d) 1052 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933).
2 "Norton v. Commerce Trust Co., 7z F. (2d) 136 (C. C. A. 5th, 1934); Levin v. Wall, 290 Mass. 423,
195 N. E. 790 (1935); Leon v. Zlatkin, 265 Mich. 225, 251 N. W. 377 (1933); Hill v. Lindsay, 21o
N. C. 694, z88 S. E. 4o6 (1936); John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Houston, 76 S. W. (2d) 176 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1934). But cf. Simpson v. Penn. Discount Corp., 335 Pa. 172, 175, 5 A. (2d) 796, 798 (1939).
To effect that parties cannot by express agreement release a cause of action based on usury, except by
purging the contract see Note. (1935) 99 A. L. R. 6oo.
" Note (1932) 17 IowA L Rav. 402.
"Read v. Mortg. Guarantee Co., iz Cal. App. (ad) 137, 53 P- (2d) 377 (1936); Enstrom v. Dunning,
124 Fla. 571, 169 So. 385 (1936); Marks v. Pope, 289 Ill. App. 558, 7 N. E. (2d) 481 (937); Klein v.
Meisels, 2 N. Y. S. (2d) 820 (N. Y. App. Div. 1938); Note (1937) 11o A. L. R- 451. To the effect that
an obligor may not be estopped by the provisions of the instrument tainted with usury: Marks v. Pope,
supra; Hall v. Mortg. Security Corp. of America, 119 W. Va. 140, 192 S. E. 145, I lI A. L. R. 118, 126
(1937); Note (1937) 11o A. L. R., supra.
3 13 ORE. CODE ANN. (1930) tit. 57, c. XII, S57-1203; 3 S. C. CODE (1932) c. 142, art. I, S6742.
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Eummr op INTNT
It is generally held that there need not necessarily be an actual intent to violate
an existing law to constitute the requisite corrupt intent for the offense of usury,8 2
but, jy the decided weight of authority, an intention on the part of the lender alone
against whom the usury acts are aimed, to exact an amount in excess of that sanc-
tioned by law, will taint the contract with usury, in which case the law will con-
clusively presume that the creditor intended the consequences of his own act and a
violation of the usury law.38 In most jurisdictions the borrower is considered as acting
under a sort of duress which renders his agreement involuntary and the fact of his
knowledge immaterial. Actually, this is the equivalent of the recognition that the
statute, having been enacted for the debtor's protection and benefit, his intent or
knowledge has been rendered non-essential. However, New York courts have con-
strued their usury statute as necessitating the unlawful intent of both the lender and
the borrower.8 4
This corrupt or unlawful intent on the part of the lender must exist at the in-
cipiency of the contract. The fact that the lending creditor subsequent to the execu-
tion of the coniract wrongfully demanded or actually took or received more than
the legal rate of interest does not contravene the statute and render the contract
usurious if the agreement at its inception was free from usury,35 because, it is reasoned,
the borrower, once he has entered the contract of loan or forbearance, is not thereafter
acting under the compulsion of pressing necessity, and any subsequent act is done
or agreement is made of his own free will.
Though the statutory penalties are imposed against the lender for the mere charg-
ing and agreeing to take, as well as the actual taking or receipt of usurious interest, the
parties may purge or disinfect a contract infected with the taint of usury, if the tainted
obligation, with the borrower's knowledge and consent, is cancelled and annulled and
a new obligation is executed free from all infection, being supported solely by the
moral obligation of the borrower to pay the money actually received with legal
interest8 6
Where it has been found that an excessive rate has been stipulated or agreed upon
"Miller v. Life Ins. Co. of Va., x18 N. C. 612, 24 S. E. 484 (z896).
"" Cotton v. Commonwealth Loan Co., 206 Ind. 626, i9o N. E. 853 ('934); Patterson v. Wyman, z42
Min!'. 70, 17o N. W. 928 (i919); Burdon v. Unrath, 47 R 1. 227, 132 AUt. 728 (1926); joy v. Provident
Loan Society, 37 S. W. (2d) 254 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931); 6 WnusroN, CoNTRACrs (rev. ed. 1938) §i698;
Note (1926) zi MtxN. L. REV. 70.
"' Guggenheimer v. Griszler, 8x N. Y. 293 (z88o); Morton v. Thurber, 85 N. Y. 550 (z88i); Brown
v. Robinson, 224 N. Y. 301, 120 N. E. 694 (1918).
" Siebert v. Hall, 63 F. (2d) 517 (C. C. A. 8th, 1933); Mitchell v. Duncan, zgo Ark. 598, 79 S. W.
(2d) 997 (1935); Anderson v. Beadle, 35 N. M. 654, 5 P- (2d) 528 (1931); Hinman v. Brundage, x3
N. Y. S. (2d) 363 (1939); Rest Haven Cemetery v. Swilley, 127 S. W. (2d) 996 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939).
" Clark v. Grey, xox Fla. io58, 132 So. 832 (1931); Wren v. People's Bank, 237 Ky. 398, 35 S. W.
(2d) 566 (1931); Union Guardian Trust Co. v. Crawford, 270 Mich. 207, 258 N. W. 248 (x935); King
v. Smith, 173 Minn. 524, 218 N. W. 102 (1928); Commerce Trust Co. v. Romp, 138 S. W. (ad) 531
(Tex. Civ. App. 1940).
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through mistake, by inadvertence or some clerical error, the statutory penalties are
generally not enforced 87
Where an agent negotiating a loan is acting in behalf of the borrower or if the
agent, though acting for the lender, has limited authority and his acts are not con-
sented to or ratified by the lender, any compensation paid to the agent cannot be
regarded as a part of the interest charged or collected by the lender. 8 If an agent
charges more than allowed by the statutory maximum by way of excessive commis-
sions or bonuses, and such acts are authorized or ratified by the lender through
acceptance of the benefits of the contract with knowledge of such acts, the contract is
thereby tainted with usury, even though the agent alone gets the benefi of the com-
missions and bonuses. 9 The statutes of several states provide absolutely that in all
cases where there is illegal interest contracted for by the transaction of any agent the
principal shall be held thereby to the same extent as though he had acted in person.40
STATus oF HoLR IN Dux CouRsE
There is some confusion among the jurisdictions as to the effect of the defense of
usury upon a holder in due course of negotiable paper. In addition to the con-
sideration that such a defense might deter the use of negotiable instruments, it would
seem that the reasons for allowing the plea of usury as against the party originally
exacting the usury are absent in the case of a bona fide purchaser of the evidence of
an indebtedness without notice of the taint of usury prior to the purchase thereof.
Perhaps with these considerations in mind, 13 states by express statute (see Chart)
have denied the defense as against a holder in due course of negotiable paper, in
many instances allowing the maker of the note to be made whole by a recovery of
the amount paid to such a holder from the exacting lender. In other states, in the
absence of statute, the same protection is given the bona fide purchaser in due course
by holding the borrower estopped to assert-usury against such a party.41 However,
in several states, where usury is said to render the contract void, it is reasoned that
the contract is a nullity ab initio, and hence its transfer cannot give it any vitality
and the defense is available even as against a holder in due course.' 2 This result has
'
T Stedhamn v. Swift & Co., supra note 27; Temple v. Hamilton, 178 Ark. 355, xx S. W. (2d) 465
(1928); Cotton v. Commonwealth Loan Co., supra note 33, at 632, igo N. E. at 856; Smythe v. Allen,
67 Miss. 146, 6 So. 627 (1889); 2 MiNN. STAT. (Mason, 1927) c. 51, §7038; 6 WIVLLISTON, loc. cit. supra
note 33.
"Finkelstein v. Chasin, 241 App. Div. 873, 271 N. Y. S. 320 (x934); Great Southern Life Ins. Co.
v. Williams, 135 S. W. (2d) 241 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940); McCall v. Smith, 184 Wash. 615, 52 P. (2d) 388
(x935); 1Wxws-oN, op. eft. upra note 33, §1697.
"Dickey v. Phoenix Finance Co., 193 Ark. 1145, 104 S. W. (2d) 8o6 (x937); Patterson v. Albert, 267
Mich. 40, 255 N. W. 158 (1934); Dodson v. Peck, 75 S. W. (2d) 461 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934); 6
WiLmsToN, op. cit. supra note 33, §x697.
'0 Naa. Cos, r. STAT. (Supp. 1939) c. 45, art. x, 545-105; 8 WAsL REv. STAT. ANN. (Remington, 1932)
tit. 46, §7304; Wyo. REv. STAT. ANN. (x931) c. 58, §58-105.
"Smith v. Mohr, 64 Mo. App. 39 (1895); Bolen v. Wright, 89 Neb. xi6, 131 N. W. x85 (19xi);
Moore v. Potomac Sav. Bank, 16o Va. 597, i69 S. F, 922 (1933).
' McCormick v. Fallier, 223 Ala. 80, 134 So. 471 (1931), x8 VA. L. REv. 79; People's Say. Bank v.
Raines, 175 Ark. 1155, 2 S. W. (2d) 20 (1928); Whitaker v. Smith, 255 Ky. 339, 73 S. W. (2d) lxos
(1934), 95 A. L. It. 727, 735 (1935); Sabine v. Paine, 223 N. Y. 401, 119 N. E. 849 (x9x8), 5 A. L R.
SURVEY oF UsuRY LAWS 43
been reached no'withstanding the Negotiable Instrument Law48 which is said not to
impliedly repeal the usury law. At the other extreme, several states provide by
statutes (see Chart) that a bona fide assignee of an evidence of indebtedness may
recover the full amount paid therefor from the maker thereof, regardless of his status
as a holder in due course of negotiable paper.
PENALTIES AND EVASION
The statutory penalties imposed for usury vary in severity from state to state and,
in many instances, bear witness to the heinousness with which the particular state
regards the offense. In the colonial period the statutory penalty for usury was gen-
erally much more severe than now. It was a forfeiture of the contract in all the laws
before x767 and of two or three times the principal in some of the southern colonies,44
in addition to stringent criminal penalties. Today civil penalties run all the way
from the forfeiture of excess interest contracted for over the maximum rate allowable,
forfeiture of all interest contracted for in almost one half of the states, forfeiture of
double and treble the contracted-for rate in a few jurisdictions to forfeiture of the
entire principal and interest in seven states. (See Chart) Several states impose one
penalty for taking or charging "legal" usury, and a greater penalty for contracting for
a stipulated "extortionate" rate of interest or for an excessive rate on certain types of
loans. (See Chart) About one third of the jurisdictions also impose some type of
criminal penalty. (See Chart)
There have been several instances where, though there was no criminal penalty
imposed by the general usury statutes, the court was sufficiently shocked that it im-
provised a device whereby criminal punishment might be meted out for long-
continued flagrant violations of the general usury laws. One such case45 was a
Kentucky one wherein the defendant was charged with the practice of loaning money
at interest rates varying from 24o% to 360% per annum. The court upheld an
indictment charging criminal conspiracy on the ground that it set forth "a nefarious
plan for the habitual exaction of gross usury, that is, in essence, the operation of the
business of extortion." In New Jersey,48 under similar circumstances, lenders have
1444, 1447 (1920); Moore v. Potomac Say. Bank, supra note 41; BRANNAN, NEGOTIABLE INszmumENs L&w
(6th ed, 1938) 617. Where usury does not render the entire contract void, but only a part thereof, usury
has been allowed as a pro tanto defense as against a holder in due course. Whitaker v. Smith, supra;
Eskridge v. Thomas, 79 W. Va. 322, 91 S. E. 7 (1g6). Contra: Bakes v. Butcher, io6 Cal. App. 358,
289 Pac. 236 (930), followed in Brown v. Guaranty Mortg. Co., 220 Cal. 532, 31 P. (2d) 788 (1934).
In Rhode Island, though a usurious contract and its security are declared void, a holder in due course
of negotiable paper is unaffected by usury. R. 1. GEN. LAws (1938) tit. LI, c. 485, §4.
"NGoTABLE INSTRUMENTs LAW, .57, provides that "A holder in due course holds the instrument
free from any defect of title of prior parties, and free from defenses available to prior parties among them-
selves ... §55 defines a defective tide as including instruments obtained "by . . . unlawful means, or for
an illegal consideration...."
"RtAN, op. cit. supra note 16, at 26, 27. "Commonwealth v. Donoghue, supra note 6.
"6State v. Diamant, 73 N. J. L. 131, 62 Ad. 286 (zgo5); State v. Martin, 77 N. J. L. 652, 73 Ad.
548 (19o9), 24 L. B. A. (n.s.) 507 (191o), distinguished in Commonwealth v. Mutual Loan & Trust
Co., 556 Ky. 299, 16o S. W. 1042 (1913), 50 L. R. A. (n.s.) 1171 (1914) On ground that in Kentucky it
was not unlawful to receive an excessive rate of interest since no penalty was imposed therefore. To the
same effect see Commonwealth v. Hill, 46 Pa. Super. 505 (1911).
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been Zonvicted of the crime of keeping a disorderly house for the habitual taking
of usurious interest on the ground that "any place of public resort in which illegal
practices are habitually carried on is a disorderly house." Also there have been
several instances 47 where the courts have granted injunctions on behalf of the state
to check flagrant violations of the usury law as public nuisances. In one such case48
the remedy at law was deemed inadequate as to the debtor, since the borrowing
employee was, in effect, rendered helpless because of his fear of being discharged, if
his wages, assigned to the lender as security, were subjected to garnishment.
The penalties for infractions of the usury laws fall short of discouraging resolute
violators. Generally the statutory maximums of the general usury laws are too low,
especially in the field of small loans, with its high carrying charges, overhead and
risk of loss, to give a fair rate of return to the lender. In the absence of an adequate
small loan law the result has been to drive the legitimato lender out of business and
leave the field wide open to the loan shark who, because he must of necessity operate
illegally and run the risk of detection and the consequent losses, exacts exorbitant
charges from necessitous borrowers who are either ignorant of their rights or in no
position to enforce them.49 The willingness of the borrower to promise all that may
be demanded of him in order to obtain temporary relief from financial embarrass-
ment has resulted in numerous devices to evade the general usury laws, though the
courts profess to look beyond the mere form of a transaction to its substance. These
include: excessive commissions, bonuses, brokerage fees, procuring fees, attorneys fees,
services charges, pretended sales, contingent interest, compound interest, and interest
taken in advance. Determined violators have often successfully evaded the general
usury laws though the laws of most jurisdictions stipulate that the maximum shall
not be exceeded "directly or indirectly" and those of a few states explicitly set forth
the amounts that may be charged for such fees and charges.-
A few states have allowed the lender by agreement to take interest in advance of
a period stipulated by statute, usually not exceeding one year, though by the taking
of such interest in advance more than the maximum contract rate of interest is in
fact taken.5" There is mucli diversity among the other states, a majority holding that
interest may be taken in advance at the'maximum rate.51 Where the interest taken
in advance does not aggregate more than the legal rate, it is held that there is no
"'State ex rel. Smith v. McMahon, 128 Kan. 772, a8o Pac. 906 (1929), 66 A. L. R.. 1072, 1o78
(1930); State ex rel. Beck v. Basham, 146 Kan. xx, 70 P. (2d) 24 (1937); State ex rel. Goff v. O'Neil,
205 Minn. 366, 286 N. .W. 3P6 (1939), 34 IL. L. REv. 497, 38 Mici. L. Rav. 279; accord, Common-
wealth ex rel. Grauman v. Continental Co., 275 Ky. 238, 1x S. NV. (2d) 49 (1938); State ex rel. Leake
v. Harris, 334 Mo, 713, 67 S. W. (2d) 98x (1934). But cf. Means v. State, 75 S. W. (2d) 953 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1934), (x935) 14 Tax L. REv. 104.
"State ex rel. Smith v. McMahon, supra note 47.
'GALLERT, HsLBoRN AND MAY, SMALL LOAN LEoIsLATIoN (1932) 53; RYAN, op. cit. fupra note 16, at
C. 15.
502 MINN. STAT. (Mason, 1927) c. 51, §7038; 1 Miss. ConE ANN. (1930) C. 37, §1951; 1 N. D. CoMP.
LAws ANN. (1913) c. 6o, art. 3, §6075; 2 CoMp. OK.A. STAT. ANN. (1921) C. 32, art. VI, §5104; 3 S. D.
CODE (1939) tit. 38, C. 38.01, §38.0105; Vyo. REv. STAT. ANN. (93) c. 58, §58-xo.
"Tholen v. Duffy, 7 Kan. "405 (187r); Bramblett v. Deposit Bank, 122 Ky. 324, 92 S. W. 283
(x9o6), 6 L. R. A. (n.s.) 612 (1907); New York Firemen Ins. Co. v. Ely, 2 Cowen 678, 704 (N. Y.
1824); Crowell v. Jones, 167 N. C. 386, 83 S. E. 551 (14); Johnson v. Groce, 175 S. C. 312, 179 S. E.
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usury.52 There is also a divergence on the question of whether interest may be
compounded. Some distinction is made between whether the agreement to pay com-
pound interest is made at the inception of the loan contract, in which case it is held
to render the contract usurious, or subsequent thereto, in which case extension of
the time of payment may be said to justify the adding of interest due to the principal
to thereafter draw interest on the whole amount due.53 A few states have authorized
compound interest by statute with stipulated qualifications.5 4
Generally a loan is said not to be usurious where the promise to pay the sum
above the legal interest depends on a contingency and not on the happening of a
certain event; in other words the promise to pay an excessive rate must be an uncon-
ditional one. It is held that a contract for a lawful rate of interest prior to maturity
and a rate exceeding the allowable maximum after maturity does not render the
agreement usurious. It is stated that the debtor could relieve himself of liability by
paying the amount due and that the excessive rate after maturity is not to be con-
sidered as interest, but rather a means for promoting punctual payment and averting
default,55 though, being a penalty, legally unenforceable.
By the weight of authority a provision giving the lender an option to accelerate
the payment of principal and interest in the event of the borrower's default in pay-
ment as the amounts become due does not taint a contract with usury, even though,
if the provision were carried out, the lender would receive interest exceeding the
allowable maximum. This excess amount has often been treated as an exaction which
is not usury but an unenforceable penalty.50  Texas courts, however, have concluded
39 (1935); Wichita Falls Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Moss, 82 S. W. (2d) 171 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935);
Dermott v. Carter, 151 Va. 81, 144 S. E. 6o2 (1928). Contra: Haines v. Commercial Mortg. Co., 200
Cal. 609, 255 Pac. 8o5, 53 A. L. IL 725 (1927); Robinson v. Morris Plan Co. of Ga., 47 Ga. App. 737,
171 S. E. 394 (i933); Burdon v. Unrath, supra note 33. 6 WILLISTON, op. cit. supra note 33, §1695;
WEBB, USuRY (1899) §112. That some distinction is made between short and long term loans see 6
WILLISTON, loc. cit. supra. Recognizing that the practice of taking interest in advance was customary,
Lordi Mansfield observed in Floyer v. Edwards, I Cowp. 112 (1774): "Upon nice calculation, it will be
found that the practice of the banks in discounting bills, exceeds the rate of five per cent (maximun),
for they take interest upon the whole sum for the whole time the bills run, but pay part of the money,
viz., by deducting the interest first; yet this is not usury."
2 WEBB, USURY (1899) §i15.
"s Sandford v. Lundquist, 8o Neb. 414, 118 N. W. 129 (igo8), 18 L. R. A. (n.s.) 633 (1909); WEBB,
USuRY (1899) §§123, 125, 129, 130.
441 CALIF. GEN. LAws (i937) act. 3757, §2; Idaho Laws 1933, C. 197, p. 390; 2 MICH. CoIP.
LAws (1929) tit. XIX, c. 176, §9243; 1 Mo. REv. STAT. (1929) c. 14, §2845; 3 MONT. REV. CODES ANN.
(1935) C. 124, §7728; VIs. STAT. (i939) tit. XIV, c. 115, §115.o5. Contra: N. D. CoMP. LAws ANN.
(Supp. 1925) c. 6o, art. 3, §6073; 3 S. D. CODE (1939) tit. 38, . 38.01, §-38.oI09.
"Easton v. Butterfield Live Stock Co., 48 Ida. 153, 279 Pac. 716 (1929); Eagle RoeK Corp. v. Idamont
Hotel Co., 59 Ida. 413, 85 P. (2d) 242 (1938); State Mut. Rodded Fire Ins. Co. v. Randall, 232 Mich.
210, 205 N. W. 165 (1925), 41 A. L. R. 973, 979 (1926); Florida Land Holding Corp. v. Burke, 135
Misc. Rep. 341, 238 N. Y. S. 1 (1929), af'd, 229 App. Div. 853 (930); Ward's Adm'r. v. Cornett, 91
Va. 676, 22 S. E. 494 (1895), 49 L. R. A. 550 (I9oo); 6 WILLISTON, op. cit. supra note 33, §1696; WEEB,
USURY (x899) §§1xg, 120. Contra: Shropshire v. Commerce Farm Credit Co., 12o Tex. 400, 39 S. W.
(2d) 11 (193I), 84 A. L. R. 1269, 1283 (933), cert. denied, 284 U. S. 675 (1931); 2 MINN. STAT.
(Mason, 1927) c. 51, §7036; N. D. ComP. LAws ANN. (Supp. 1925) c. 6o, art. 3, §6072a.
"Sager v. American Inv. Co. 17o Ark. 568, 28o S. W. 654 (1926); Easton v. Butterfield Live Stock
Co., supra note 55; Goodale v. Wallace, ig S. D. 405, 103 N. W. 651 (1!o5); Cissna Loan Co. v. Gawley,
87 Wash. 438, 151 Pac. 792 (1915); Notes (1933) 84 A. L. R. 1283, (1936) xoo A. L. R. 1431. That
provision for acceleration of accrued and unaccrued interest does not constitute usury unless the earned
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that if the accelerating provision shows that, upon the exercise of the option to
accelerate the maturity of principal and interest, unearned interest in excess of the
statutory maximum rate may be received the contract is thereby rendered usurious.57
The tendency, in Texas as well as other jurisdictions, appears to be to construe the
contract, wherever possible, to provide for the collection of only accrued or earned
interest at a lawful rate in the event of acceleration and to be untainted with usury."
Where the contract gives the borrower an option to pay before the maturity of the
loan, and the debtor exercises this prepayment privilege by paying the principal with
interest to the date of maturity before such payment is due, the transaction is not
thereby tainted with usury since the debtor, acting voluntarily to terminate the loan,
cannot -thereby render a transaction usurious which, but for such a circumstance,
would be entirely free from any claim of usury and because the lender has a right
to insist upon the full amount of his investment and the contracted for interest as
consideration for assenting to the acceleration. 59
REMEDiEs oF BoRRowER
Pursuant to the policy, embodied in the usury laws, of extending protection to
the necessitious borrower by operating on the lender, two thirds of the states have
statutes allowing the borrower or his legal representative, and in several states the
assignee or judgment creditor of the debtor, to recover back usurious interest though
paid to the lender voluntarily. (See Chart) Such a right of recovery usually exists
only by virtue of legislative fiat. Other states, which disallow recovery, take the
view that the defense of usury is to be used only as a shield, not as a sword, and that
voluntary payment constitutes a waiver of the defense. Under some statutes the
amount recoverable may be double or treble, which may often exceed the forfeiture
imposed when an action is brought by the creditor to enforce a usurious contract,
apparently indicating that the actual taking or receiving of usurious interest and the
completion of a transaction tainted with usury is considered more odious than
merely agreeing to take or receive an excessive rate. Usually recovery by the victim-
ized borrower for his own benefit is subject to a stipulated time limit; a number of
states after the debtor's right of recovery has been barred, provide for an additional
excessive interest is collected see Tobin v. Holmbe, 172 Okla. 546, 549, 45 P. (2d) 76, 720 (1935). That
the debtor by his voluntary default cannot bring his creditor under the very heavy penalties of the usury
laws: French v. Mortg. Guarantee Co., 104 P. (ad) 655 (Cal. 1940).
87West v. Ogden, 74 F. (2d) 777 (C. C. A. 5th, 1935); Atwood v. Deming Inv. Co., $5 F. (2d)
x8o (C. C. A. 5th, 1932); Ingram v. Temple Trust Co., xo8 S. W. (2d) 3o6 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937);
Shropshire v. Commerce Farm Credit Co., supra note 55.
" Clement v. Scott, 6o S. W. (ad) 258 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933); Lincoln Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Anderson,
124 Tex. 566, 8o S. W. (2d) 294 (Tex. Coin. App. 1935), motion overruled, 8i S. W. (2d) 1xxa;
Armstrong v. Alliance Trust Co. 88 F. (ad) 449 (C. C. A. 5th, 1937); Matthews v. Georgia State Say.
Ass'n, 132 Ark.-21g, 200 S. W. 130 (i918); Graham v. FitRs, 53 Fla. 1046, 43 So. 512 (1907); Tipton
v. Ellsworth x8 Ida. 207, 109 Pac. 134 (i91o); Moore v. Cameron, 93 N. C. 5x (1885).
" Barringer v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. CO., 9 F. Supp. 493 (E. D. S. C. 1935); Eldred v. Hart, 87
Ark. 534, 113 S. W. 213 (19o8); French v. Mortg. Guarantee Co., supra note 56; Grail v. San Diego Bldg.
& Loan Ass'n, 127 Cal. App. 250, 15 P. (ad) 797 (1932); Smithwick v. Whitley, 152 N. C. 366, 67
S. E. 914 (1910), 28 L. R. A. (n.s.) 113; Clement Mortg. Co. v. Johnston, 83 Okla. 153, 201 Pac. 247
(1921); Cooke v. Young, 89 S. C. 173, 71 S. E. 837 (igz); Cissna Loan Co. v. Gawley, supra note 56.
SuRvEy oF UsURY LAWS 47
period in which stipulated officials may recover the amount paid in excess plus any
forfeiture for the use of the school or poor fund as the case may be. (See Chart)
It is settled in most jurisdictions that a borrower seeking such equitable relief as
the cancellation of securities given to secure a usurious contract or to restrain the fore-
closure of such securities must, under the mandate of the maxim "he who seeks
equity must do equity," first tender the payment of the principal and legal interest,
on the theory that it is unconscionable for the debtor to keep the money borrowed
without paying any interest thereon and yet ask the chancellor for special relief.60
Several states have enacted statutes explicitly making available equitable relief with-
out the necessity of such tender.61 Since usury laws are enacted for the protection
of borrowers and to discourage the exaction of usury, it would seem that the debtor
would be doing equity if, as condition precedent to equitable relief, he tendered the
amount which the exacting lender might have recovered if he had initiated the
action.62
CONFLICT OF LAws
In testing a contract for usury and in determining what usury law is applicable,
three different theories have been advanced: (i) that the law of the place where the
agreement was made should govern its nature and validity (lex loci contractus);
(2) that the law of the place where the contract is to be performed should govern
(lex loci solutionis); or (3) that the real intention of the parties, if they act in good
faith without intending to escape the consequences of a usurious transaction, is
determinative, providing the law intended to be applicable has some reasonable rela-
tion to an important element of the contract. This latter view appears to be supported
by the weight of huthority, being bolstered by the fiction that the parties are presumed
to have intended to contract with reference to the law of that jurisdiction which will
uphold the contract.63 A few courts have gone so far as to apply the law of a
jurisdiction other than that of the lex loci contractus or lex loci solutionis, such as the
domicile of the debtor or the place where the security reposes, where the requisite
intent has been found.6 4 Resolving the question of what law should be controlling
in terms of the intent or presumed intent has been criticized on the ground that it
is almost impossible to know when a court will find a bona fide intent or bad faith
and an intent to evade the laws against usury by juggling the jurisdictions.65
"
0American Freehold Land & Mortg. Co. v. Jefferson, 69 Miss. 770, 12 So. 464 (i892); McTavish v.
Green, 220 Mich. 6o6, 19° N. W. 736 (1922); Bolen v. Wright, supra note 41; Fanning v. Dunham, 5
Johns. Ch. 122 (N. Y. i821); Kenney Co. v. Hotel Co., 208 N. C. 295, 18o S. E. 697 (1935); Moncrief
v. Palmer, 44 R. I. 37, i4 At. iSi (1921), (1922) 22 CALIF. L. Rav. 186; x POMEROY, EQ. JuRis. (4th ed.
1918) §39x; 2 id. §937. But cf. Robbins v. Blanc, 1o5 Fla. 625, 142 So. 223 (932); Trauernicht v. Kings-
ton, x56 Minn. 442, 195 N. W. 278 (1923); Yonack v. Emery, 4 S. W. (2d) 293 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928).
612 ARx. STAT. (Pope, 1937) C. 112, §9405; NEB. CoMP. STAT. (1929) C. 45, art. 1, §45-107;
N. Y. LAws (Thompson, 1939) pt. I, Gen. Bus. Law, §377; UTAH REv. STAT. ANN. (933) tit. 44,
§44-0-8; WIS. STAT. (1939) tit. XIV, c. 115, §115.08; Wyo. REv. STAT. ANN. (1931) c. 58, §58-107.
That borrower shall only be required to pay principal: ALA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1928) c. 308, §8567;
VA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1936) §5554, Ruckdeschall v. Seibel, 126 Va. 359, 101 S. E. 425 (1919).
"' For criticism of the rule that a borrower seeking equity must first tender payment of principal and
legal interest see (1934) 12 N. C. L. REv. 279, (1935) 14 N. C. L. REV. X14.
as2 BEALF, CoF'sacr oF LAws (1935) §347.4; GOODmICH, CONFLICr OF LAws (1927) §io8; 6
WILu-ros, op. cit. supra note 33, §1792.
*See note 63 supra. 2 BEAL"E, loc. cit. supra note 63.
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